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The Limits on Congress’s Power To Do Nothing:
A Preliminary Inquiry
WILLIAM P. MARSHALL*
The subject of this Essay may seem anachronistic to some: the constitutional
implications of congressional obstruction, a matter typified by the Republican
Congress’s opposition to the Obama administration during six of its eight years in
office. After all, we are now living in a period of an ostensibly united government
under a Trump presidency and a Republican Congress, a phenomenon that, as other
writers in the symposium point out, raises its own set of constitutional concerns.
Nevertheless, the problem of congressional obstruction is one that is likely to
return to the constitutional landscape. 1 The country’s equally divided electorate,
combined with the nation’s intense polarization, means that we can fully expect
future episodes of divided government and more prolonged periods when the
Congress, no matter which party controls it, will be intent upon using whatever
tactics may be available to frustrate the agenda of the opposing party’s presidency. 2
Further, even if polarization somehow subsides at the grassroots, the dynamic of
the permanent campaign will continue to foster congressional obstruction. When
each party views each other’s successes as damaging to their own electoral
prospects, there is little room for cross-aisle cooperation.3
President Obama’s response to congressional obstruction was to adopt a “we
can’t wait” strategy under which he strived to pursue as much of his agenda as he
could unilaterally, without waiting for Congress to assent. 4 That approach,
however, generated serious criticism on grounds that it exacerbated an already
dangerous trend of centering too much power in the presidency.5 Congress, after all,
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1. Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized
Democracy in America, 99 CAL. L. REV. 273, 326 (2011) (“I see no institutional or legal
changes that could overcome the paralysis that will characterize divided government, amidst
polarized parties, in the coming years.”).
2. See Michael J. Teter, Congressional Gridlock’s Threat to Separation of Powers,
2013 WIS. L. REV. 1097, 1099 (2013) (describing the modern legislature as being “defined
by heightened partisanship”).
3. See SIDNEY BLUMENTHAL, THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN 23–24 (1982) (discussing
how concern for the next election, rather than long-term results, motivates current politics);
Pildes, supra note 1, at 330–31 (“[H]yperpolarized parties are likely to yield little more than
legislative gridlock and paralysis.”); see also Thomas E. Mann & Norman J. Ornstein,
Finding the Common Good in an Era of Dysfunctional Governance, DAEDALUS, Spring
2013, at 15, 18 (“[T]he two major political parties in recent decades have become
increasingly homogeneous and have moved toward ideological poles.”).
4. Kenneth S. Lowande & Sidney M. Milkis, “We Can’t Wait”: Barack Obama,
Partisan Polarization and the Administrative Presidency, 12 FORUM 3, 3 (2014) (“[W]e
can’t wait for an increasingly dysfunctional Congress to do its job. Where they won’t act, I
will.”) (quoting President Obama).
5. See Jack M. Balkin, The Last Days of Disco: Why the American Political System is
Dysfunctional, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1159, 1194 (2014) (“The President’s opponents naturally decry
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provides the primary bulwark against presidential overreaching,6 and the argument
that the presidency should assume more power because Congress is using its
prerogatives to check executive authority seems exactly backward.7 If Congress is to
serve its checking function, it would seem that, at the least, it should have the
authority not to accede to executive branch direction.8 At least on one level, then,
Congress has, and should have, the power to do nothing.
The problem of congressional obstruction that President Obama faced, however,
also has serious constitutional overtones. First, as history has demonstrated, congressional obstruction often means that Presidents will “push the envelope” when their
agenda is frustrated. 9 President Obama was not the first in this respect, and he undoubtedly will not be the last. (Indeed, as this Essay was going to press, President
Trump announced that he will also use unilateral executive action to overcome congressional inaction.10)
In part, presidents “push the envelope” because of the truth in the old maxim that
power abhors a vacuum.11 In part, however, they do so because of expectations.
When only the presidency is able to take major governmental action, the expectation

each round of administrative fixes, arguing that he lacks respect for the rule of law and has
become a tyrant.”); William P. Marshall, Actually We Should Wait: Evaluating the Obama
Administration’s Commitment to Unilateral Executive-Branch Action, 2014 UTAH L. REV.
773, 781 (2014) (“Since the middle of the twentieth century, presidential power has expanded
at a dramatic rate, and that expansion continues unabated.”); see also Martin S. Flaherty, The
Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1819–20 (1996) (describing the trend toward
increasing executive power, and arguing that this trend is a threat to originalists and functionalists alike). See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC (2010) (discussing the expansion of presidential power).
6. See Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of Arbitrary
Inaction, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2217, 2222 (2013) (describing the potent congressional
checks against the executive branch); see also Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U.
PA. L. REV. 715, 768, 772–73 (2012) (arguing that Congress’s “hard” and “soft” powers allow
it to “vigorously assert itself against the other two branches”).
7. See Chafetz, supra note 6, at 772–73 (describing the constitutional powers and checks
intentionally allocated to Congress).
8. Id. (stating that “the separation of powers requires that the branches maintain the
institutional capacity to assert themselves against one another”) (emphasis omitted) (footnote
omitted).
9. Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Democracy and Dysfunction: An Exchange, 50
IND. L. REV. 281, 325 (2016) (“The worse Congressional gridlock becomes, the more presidents push the envelope of what they can do within the executive branch . . . .”).
10. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Oct. 10, 2017, 7:30 AM), https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/917698839846576130 [https://perma.cc/AH8F-MDWK]
(“Since Congress can’t get its act together on HealthCare, I will be using the power of the pen
to give great HealthCare to many people—FAST.”). What is particularly notable about
President Trump’s tweet is that it suggests that it is permissible for a President to use unilateral
action to circumvent congressional inaction even when his own party controls Congress.
11. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (arguing that “congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes,
at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential
responsibility”); see also Balkin, supra note 5, at 1193–95 (arguing that when Congress does
not wield its legislative power, the President “begins to take on increasing responsibility for
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becomes that the executive is the appropriate branch to take major government action.12 It therefore becomes politically more difficult to claim that a President is
overreaching when he acts unilaterally. Equally significantly, it also becomes more
politically difficult for the President to refuse to act.13 As such, the exercise of presidential authority builds on itself.14 The lesson of history is that, in the long run,
congressional obstruction tends to empower the presidency rather than weaken it;15
this further exacerbates the power gulf between the President and the Congress.16
Second, constitutional concerns may also arise if a President does not act in response to an obstructionist Congress. While accumulating too much power in the
presidency creates the danger of tyranny coming in through the front door in the form
of an imperial presidency, a dysfunctional government that does not respond to the
needs of its citizenry creates the danger of tyranny coming in through the back. A
society that has lost faith in its institutions is vulnerable to totalitarian appeals and
intervention.17
The Constitution, arguably, was concerned with both types of threats.18 The
Framers, of course, famously designed the Constitution to foster a system of checks
and balances in which none of the three branches would be able to amass and exercise
too much power.19 But the Framers also endeavored to create a Constitution that

solving problems of domestic as well as foreign policy”).
12. See Dino P. Christenson & Douglas L. Kriner, Constitutional Qualms or Politics as
Usual? The Factors Shaping Public Support for Unilateral Action, 61 AM. J. POL. SCI. 335, 336–
37 (2017) (attributing the President’s ability to act unilaterally to both public support and to
Congress’s inability to unite in defense of separation of powers); see also Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Showdowns, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 991, 1006–07 (2008) (arguing
that “public constitutional sentiment” often dictates which branch will act in a given situation).
13. See Steven G. Calabresi, Book Review, “The Era of Big Government is Over,” 50
STAN. L. REV. 1015, 1040 (1998) (reviewing ALAN BRINKLEY, NELSON W. POLSBY &
KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, NEW FEDERALIST PAPERS: ESSAYS IN DEFENSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
(1997)) (arguing that a President’s inability to meet expectations will lead to the perception
that his presidency has failed).
14. See William P. Marshall, Why the Assertion of a “Nationalist” Presidency Does Not
Support Claims for Expansive Presidential Power, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 549, 563 (2010).
15. See Teter, supra note 6, at 2222 (analyzing executive usurpation of legislative power,
such as when the War Powers Resolution is not enforced by Congress, thereby expanding
executive authority in an area shared by the legislature); see also Josh Chafetz, The
Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065, 2083–84 (2013) (analyzing
President Obama’s use of recess appointments in response to congressional obstruction).
16. ACKERMAN, supra note 5, at 40 (arguing that the modern presidency has an advantage
over the other branches, because “the White House staff can create sweeping changes that will
be very hard to reverse once they are set in motion”); see also Flaherty, supra note 5, at 1816–
24 (detailing the modern imbalance of power between the legislative and executive branches,
and arguing that there is a great disparity between the Founders’ characterization of executive
power and the current political landscape).
17. Cf. Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA
L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
18. Neil Siegel, The Essential Functions of the National Government in the Collective
Action Constitution 2 (unpublished manuscript on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
19. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (“[T]he great
security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists
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would work.20 Congressional action (or inaction) that imperils the ability of the government to function also raises constitutional concerns.21
It is therefore appropriate to examine whether there may be, or should be, limits
on Congress’s power to do nothing.22 Concededly, the case for finding such limitations is not easy. As Part I of this Essay will show, arguments for limiting Congress’s
authority to do nothing are not readily found in history, text, or constitutional structure. Part I concludes, however, that the need for establishing some constitutional
limits on congressional inaction is nevertheless compelling because of the seriousness of the dangers involved. Accordingly, Part II goes on to advance an approach
that would limit Congress’s power to do nothing in certain circumstances.
Specifically, Part II proposes an approach that would limit Congress’s power to do
nothing based on the type of power that Congress is (or is not) exercising. Congress
could not refuse to act when the exercise of the power in question is necessary for
the government to function, such as appropriations or appointments; but it may refuse
to act on matters such as legislation that do not raise functionality concerns. Part III
addresses some possible objections to this thesis. Part IV presents a brief conclusion.
I. CONGRESS’S POWER TO DO NOTHING
The case in favor of finding a constitutional obligation for Congress to act is not
initially promising.23 As a historical matter, “Do-Nothing” Congresses are not a new
phenomenon. President Truman most notably used the term in his battles with

in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and
personal motives to resist encroachments of the others.”).
20. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 21 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing the various defects of the
Articles of Confederation), NO. 62, at 314 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (noting that
difficulty in passing legislation “may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial”).
21. See Siegel, supra note 18.
22. To date, the most significant work on this subject has been done by Michael Teter.
See Michael J. Teter, Letting Congress Vote: Judicial Review of Arbitrary Legislative Inaction,
87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1435 (2014); Teter, supra note 2; Teter, supra note 6. Teter’s work focuses
on the concept of arbitrary inaction, meaning inaction that is not based upon deliberative policy
choices. In contrast, the approach offered here concentrates on the distinction between
Congress’s nonexercise of powers that are necessary to government functionality and those
that are not. See infra notes 57–79 and accompanying text.
23. As a number of commentators have pointed out, not all “inaction” is the same. Teter,
for example, distinguishes between nonarbitrary and arbitrary inaction, the latter being “when
Congress fails to act on a matter within its constitutional domain, and such failure lacks a
proper motivational or factual basis or is the exercise of discretionary power that involves no
clear standards or explanation.” Teter, supra note 22, at 1441. Franita Tolson distinguishes
permissible gridlock from excessive gridlock, the latter being when there is broad political
agreement about a course of action but party loyalty stymies any attempt at compromise.
Franita Tolson, The Union as a Safeguard Against Faction: Congressional Gridlock as State
Empowerment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2267, 2272 (2013). Josh Chafetz, in turn, differentiates between “legislative inaction resulting from the lack of an adequate public consensus
behind a particular course of action, on the one hand, and legislative inaction resulting from
some procedural roadblock or dysfunction internal to our political institutions, on the other.”
Chafetz, supra note 15, at 2075.
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Congress during the late 1940s,24 but descriptions of Congress as Do-Nothing have
been around since at least the nineteenth century.25 More significantly, the critique
that a particular Congress is not acting responsively or responsibly goes back even
further. Attacks on Congress for not acting are as old as the Congress itself.26
Congressional inaction of the type witnessed during the Obama years, where such
inaction was designed with the specific purpose to make the President fail,27 also has
historical precedent.28 During the presidency of Martin Van Buren, for example,
Congress endeavored to block the efforts of the President to extricate the country

24. See President Harry S. Truman, Democratic Convention Acceptance Speech (July 15,
1948) (transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/spc/character/links/truman
_speech.html [https://perma.cc/B4EN-9ZB2]); President Harry S. Truman, Know Nothing,
Do Nothing Congress (Oct. 7, 1948) (transcript available at http://www.speechesusa.com/Transcripts/harry_truman-nothing.html [https://perma.cc/S8UH-VBMB]).
25. See, e.g., Bill of Indictment Against Congress, CADIZ SENTINEL, Jan. 9, 1867, at 1
(arguing that the efforts of the Congress to impeach Andrew Johnson were wrong in light of
Congress’s failure to act to prevent national crises); The Do-Nothing Congress—A Late
Session, NAT’L REPUBLICAN, Mar. 2, 1876 (criticizing the Congress for a particularly
unproductive session). The denunciation of Congress as “Do-Nothing” was also occasionally
raised by members of Congress themselves. See The Work of Congress, NEW-YORK TRIBUNE,
Apr. 16, 1880, at 1 (quoting then-Senator James G. Blaine); see also Fifty-Second Congress. An
Analysis of Its Work Presented by Representative Henderson., RECORD-UNION, Mar. 11, 1893.
26. R. Shep Melnick, The Conventional Misdiagnosis: Why “Gridlock” Is Not Our
Central Problem and Constitutional Revision Is Not the Solution, 94 B.U. L. REV. 767, 789–
90 (2014) (describing the legislative gridlock during James Madison’s presidency as even
more intense than the current level of partisanship in Congress); see Sarah A. Binder, The
Dynamics of Legislative Gridlock, 1947–96, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 519, 519 (1999) (showing
that complaints about gridlock in American politics predate the Constitution); see also David
W. Brady & Hahrie C. Han, Polarization Then and Now: A Historical Perspective, in 1 RED
AND BLUE NATION? CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES OF AMERICA’S POLARIZED POLITICS 119,
120 (Pietro S. Nivola & David W. Brady eds., 2006) (“For many years, our political institutions and policymaking processes have withstood sharp divisions between the parties. In fact,
the early history of the two-party political system in the United States exhibited much more
colorful anecdotes about polarization.”).
27. See Glenn Kessler, When Did Mitch McConnell Say He Wanted to Make Obama a
‘One-Term President’?, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/blogs/fact-checker/post/when-did-mcconnell-say-he-wanted-to-make-obama-a-one-termpresident/2012/09/24/79fd5cd8-0696-11e2-afff-d6c7f20a83bf_blog.html [https://perma.cc
/B5MA-F69M] (describing McConnell’s explicitly partisan statement that a one-term
presidency for Obama should be the GOP’s top priority); see also ROBERT DRAPER, DO NOT
ASK WHAT GOOD WE DO: INSIDE THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES xvii–xix (2012)
(quoting Republican Representative Kevin McCarthy as saying, “We’ve gotta challenge
[Democrats] on every single bill,” and noting that top House Republicans met the night of
President Obama’s inauguration to devise a plan to “mortally wound” President Obama
through “united and unyielding opposition”).
28. Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional
Dysfunction?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1704 (2015) (“[T]he turn of the nineteenth century
saw comparably high levels of conflict between Federalists and Democratic-Republicans, as
well as familiar patterns that included ‘increased partisan polarization, spreading over new
dimensions of politics and policy,’ ‘close electoral parity between the two parties,’ and ruthless strategic behavior to gain electoral advantage.”).
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from an economic crisis solely in order to further its own partisan agenda.29 History,
then, provides very little support for the argument that congressional inaction is, or
can be, unconstitutional. Congressional inaction has simply been too prevalent in our
nation’s history.30
Constitutional text also does not easily support the argument that Congress has a
duty to act. The text, rather, imposes very few obligations on the Congress. Article I
mandates that the House of Representatives must choose a speaker and other officers;31 and that the Senate must choose other officers and a president pro tempore in
the absence of the Vice President.32 It also demands that each house must be “the
Judge of the Elections”33 and keep a journal of its proceedings.34 It further requires
that Congress from time to time publish a statement and account of receipts and expenditures of all public money,35 and that it appropriate money for the armed forces.36
Article V provides that Congress must call a convention for proposing constitutional
amendments upon application of two-thirds of the states.37 Article VI mandates that
Senators and Representatives be “bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support [the]
Constitution.”38 The Twelfth Amendment states that both houses must be present
while the President of the Senate opens all the certificates and counts the votes for
President.39 The 20th Amendment requires that Congress assemble at least once a
year.40 The 25th Amendment instructs that Congress must decide whether the
President is unfit for duty if “the Vice President and a majority of either the principal
officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law
provide” transmit to it a “written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office.”41 Congress, of course, has a multitude of other
powers; but beyond meeting these relatively minimal requirements, its exercise of
those powers is essentially optional.
Constitutional structure also cuts against the conclusion that Congress has a duty
to act. After all, the Constitution presupposes that Congress will check the executive.

29. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FORGOTTEN PRESIDENTS: THEIR UNTOLD
CONSTITUTIONAL LEGACY 4–11 (2013) (noting Whig Party efforts to obstruct the agenda of
President Martin Van Buren).
30. See Binder, supra note 26; Melnick, supra note 26; see also Brady & Han, supra note
26, at 120; JOHN J. PATRICK, RICHARD M. PIOUS & DONALD A. RITCHIE, THE OXFORD GUIDE
TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 240 (2002) (noting that “[e]ven in the 1st Congress,
minority members delivered long speeches and used the rules to obstruct legislation they opposed.”).
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
32. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5.
33. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
34. Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
35. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
36. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
37. Id. art. V.
38. Id. art. VI, § 3.
39. Id. amend. XII.
40. Id. amend. XX, § 2 (amending U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 which also required that
Congress assemble once a year albeit on a different date. Both provisions, however, allowed
Congress to adjust the date from the specific date set forth in the text).
41. Id. amend. XXV, § 4.
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Obstructing a President’s agenda, therefore, may simply be a matter of Congress doing its job.42 To be sure, this structural argument may not be as straightforward as it
originally seems. As Michael Teter points out, certain types of congressional inaction
can also arguably raise structural concerns because Congress’s failure to act can
mean that it is not performing its checking function.43 Teter therefore distinguishes
between Congress’s refusal to take action because of deliberative choice and its failure to act because of its inability to make substantive policy decisions—the latter of
which he describes as unconstitutional “arbitrary inaction.”44 Yet even this insight
does not deny that an allowance for purposeful congressional inaction is an essential
part of the constitutional structure.
The argument from constitutional structure also identifies a definitional concern
inherent in the position that congressional inaction can be unconstitutional. At what
point does Congress’s proper constitutional exercise of its checking function turn
into improper congressional obstructionism?45 The difficulty of this determination is
no doubt exacerbated by the fact that the constitutional goals of checking power and
simultaneously allowing for effective use of that power are inevitably in tension.46 A
President focused on making government work will be motivated to take actions that
circumvent congressional blockage.47 A Congress intent on blocking the President
will take actions (or inactions) that could lead to situations in which the government

42. Michael J. Gerhardt, Why Gridlock Matters, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2107
(2013) (describing a former senator’s position that intentional legislative gridlock in opposition to the Affordable Care Act was a “constitutional necessity”); see also Jeff Jacoby,
Gridlock, or Democracy as Intended?, BOS. GLOBE (Dec. 25, 2011), https://www.bostonglobe
.com/opinion/2011/12/25/gridlock-democracy-intended/EJlqriPsRHqeW9wxlAhtMK/story
.html [https://perma.cc/N656-A6DR] (arguing that the current state of gridlock is simply a
functional norm, intended by the Framers).
43. Teter, supra note 6, at 2222 (“Congress cannot perform [its] checking function if it
cannot make deliberative decisions.”); see also Teter, supra note 2, at 1138 (“[I]f Congress
cannot act, it cannot effectively check the executive—or the judiciary—when the other
branch extends beyond its authority or impairs Congress's ability to fulfill its constitutional
responsibilities.”).
44. Teter, supra note 6, at 2218 (“If Congress chooses to maintain the status quo or if the
Senate decides to reject a nominee, that amounts to a substantive decision. But that’s not what
is happening. With increasing frequency, Congress fails to make policy decisions.”) (emphasis
in original).
45. See Tolson, supra note 23, at 2272 (2013) (“Although our current system is an obvious departure from the Madisonian ideal, distinguishing ‘permissible’ levels of gridlock from
gridlock that is ‘excessive’ and therefore unconstitutional remains difficult.”); see also David
E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J. 2, 41 (2014) (arguing that
the result of congressional gridlock is “a widespread fear that the breakdown of certain separation-of-powers conventions is contributing to a breakdown of our system of representative
government”).
46. Teter, supra note 2, at 1114 (stating that the concepts of separation of powers and the
checking power “are, at least facially, at odds with each other”).
47. See Lowande & Milkis, supra note 4, at 3–6 (describing the gradual expansion of the
President’s administrative authority in response to partisan legislative gridlock); see also
Marshall, supra note 5, at 776–77 (describing President Obama’s strategy to “circumvent the
gridlock in Congress and accomplish several domestic policy initiatives through the unilateral
exercise of executive power”).
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is disabled from accomplishing its basic functions (consider, for example, the battles
over whether Congress should raise the debt ceiling in order to pay for its alreadyaccumulated debts).48
Further, any attempt to draw a line between Congress’s appropriate exercise of its
checking function and improper obstructionism will necessarily be hampered by the
difficulty in overcoming partisan perspectives. Many who condemned the
Republican Congress as obstructing the agenda of President Obama might very well
praise the use of those same tactics to combat the agenda of President Trump as examples of Congress acting according to its highest calling.49 Conversely, many who
saw the Republican efforts to battle President Obama as examples of Congress acting
appropriately might very well see similar Democratic efforts to oppose President
Trump as obstruction (in fact, the Senate majority leader and principal architect of
the Republican efforts to frustrate President Obama’s presidency has made exactly
this claim).50 Distinguishing between partisan and constitutionally based criticism of
congressional inaction is therefore unlikely to be easy. Determinations of
unconstitutional inaction, in short, then will inevitably raise the concern of a lack of
manageable standards.51
Finally, any theory setting forth a constitutional obligation for Congress to act
would raise a host of enforcement concerns. Is such a doctrine justiciable?52 Could
courts compel the legislature to act without raising serious separation of powers

48. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 5, at 1176 (characterizing the debt ceiling crisis of 2011
and the government shutdown of 2013, at least in part, as attempts “to weaken and humiliate
the President of the opposition party”).
49. See Rachel Dicker, The Internet Wants Congress to #DoYourJob and Consider
Merrick Garland, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Mar. 17, 2016, 12:46 PM), https://www.usnews
.com/news/articles/2016-03-17/doyourjob-hashtag-asks-congress-to-consider-merrick-garlandfor-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/TW5C-A6TY] (discussing Senator Chuck Schumer’s
condemnation of the Republicans’ partisan filibuster of President Obama’s Supreme Court
nomination). But see Robert Barnes, Ed O’Keefe & Ann E. Marimow, Schumer: Democrats
Will Filibuster Gorsuch Nomination, WASH. POST (Mar. 23, 2017), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/gorsuch-confirmation-hearing-to-focus-today-on-testimonyfrom-friends-foes/2017/03/23/14d21116-0fc7-11e7-9d5a-a83e627dc120_story.html [https://
perma.cc/R7PL-JZPB] (discussing Senator Chuck Schumer’s role in leading the partisan
filibuster of President Trump’s Supreme Court nomination).
50. Compare Kessler, supra note 27 (citing Senator McConnell’s statement that making
Obama a one-term President should be the GOP’s top priority), with Cristian Farias, Mitch
McConnell Says Americans Won’t Tolerate Democrats Blocking Supreme Court Nominations,
HUFFPOST (Jan. 4, 2017, 6:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/mitch-mcconnellmerrick-garland-supreme-court_us_586d6720e4b0c4be0af2bd3a [https://perma.cc/2LHLTX5H] (noting McConnell’s criticism of Democrats as obstructionists for opposing President
Trump’s opportunity to nominate a Supreme Court even though McConnell had refused to
hold a vote on President Obama’s nominee).
51. Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (indicating that constitutional standards
need to be manageable in order to allow for judicial review). But see Teter, supra note 22, at
1472–75 (arguing that, while the “manageable standards” requirement of the political question
doctrine is certainly an obstacle, it ultimately should not prevent a justiciable challenge to
congressional inaction).
52. See Teter, supra note 22, at 1472–75.
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concerns?53 If it were concluded that there was a nonjudicially enforceable obligation
for Congress to act, would that have any effect?
These concerns notwithstanding, the project of finding limits on Congress’s
power to do nothing is critical for a number of reasons. The first is the most basic.
Federal government dysfunction can threaten the provision of basic services and national security (as could occur in the case of a government shutdown).54
Congressional inaction can therefore literally place the nation at risk.
Second, a theory of a congressional obligation to act may be necessary to prevent
the further expansion of presidential power. As noted above, there is irony in the use
of congressional obstruction as a weapon against presidential overreach. It tends to
increase presidential power in the long run.55 Finding constitutional limits on
Congress’s power to do nothing, in short, may paradoxically serve to lessen, rather
than increase, the expanse of presidential power.
Third, and more pragmatically, a theory of a congressional obligation to act may
be necessary to provide a constitutional backstop against further dysfunction. At present, the pressures of polarization are so forceful that even members of Congress who
might otherwise work across the aisle are deterred from doing so.56 In such a political
environment, where politicians need excuses to work with each other, setting a
constitutional standard for congressional behavior might provide some political
cover for bipartisan action.
Accordingly, it is worthwhile to investigate whether a workable theory can be
constructed that posits that Congress has a constitutional duty to act, at least in
some circumstances. The next Part offers such an approach.

53. But see id. at 1460–61 (arguing that judicial review of potentially arbitrary inaction
by Congress would actually support constitutional notions of separation of powers and interbranch accountability).
54. For a synopsis of the 2013 U.S. government shutdown’s negative effects on government entities responsible for public health (including the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention), see Raina M. Merchant, Commentary, The 2013 US Government Shutdown
(#Shutdown) and Health: An Emerging Role for Social Media, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2248,
2248–49 (2014); see also Cal Woodward, Shutdown Hits Health Services, but Obamacare
Steams on, 185 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N 1390, 1390 (2013) (describing the U.S. government’s
shutdown as “delivering a blow to medical research, dampening disease detection and keeping
the gravely ill out of potentially life-saving clinical trials”).
55. See supra notes 9–16 and accompanying text.
56. See Jonathan Martin & Kenneth P. Vogel, Trump Backers ‘Furious’ That Senator
Stood Against Health Care Bill, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com
/2017/06/30/us/politics/heller-trump-health-care-adelson-wynn.html [https://perma.cc/736FT322] (discussing the condemnation of Senator Dean Heller by his fellow Republicans for his
refusal to support the conservative replacement for the Affordable Care Act); see also Mark
A. Graber, Belling the Partisan Cats: Preliminary Thoughts on Identifying and Mending a
Dysfunctional Constitutional Order, 94 B.U. L. REV. 611, 645 (2014) (“The goal of most
successful constitutional reforms in the United States is to entrench the existing structure of
political competition and align other constitutional practices so that the dominant political
forces can operate the constitutional order more effectively.”).
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II. A THEORY OF CONGRESS’S DUTY TO ACT: DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN TYPES OF
CONGRESSIONAL POWERS
There is a difference between Congress’s failing to act on a President’s favored
piece of legislation (including those that enjoy popular support) and Congress’s failure to pass a budget. The former may result in the maintenance of bad policy; the
latter may lead to a government shutdown. All inactions do not have the same consequences.
I begin with this understanding as a starting point for determining when congressional inaction should be deemed unconstitutional. The constitutionality of congressional inaction should be determined by reference to the specific type of congressional power involved and the consequences of that power’s nonexercise, and not on
the basis of how purportedly egregious the congressional behavior in question appears to be.57 Specifically, and preliminarily, I would suggest that congressional failure to act on appropriations58 or, in the case of the Senate, its failure to consider
presidential appointments under its advise and consent authority,59 should be subject
to constitutional scrutiny. Its failure to take legislative action, as when it refuses to
sign on to a President’s particular policy agenda and enact his proposed legislation,
should be constitutionally unobjectionable. (I leave for later discussion whether other
congressional powers, such as its oversight and investigatory authority or its powers
over war and national security, should or could also trigger constitutional scrutiny
when Congress fails to act.)
The primary basis for this distinction is straightforward. Congressional inaction
in the areas of appropriations and appointments threatens the ability of the government to function. The government cannot run without funding,60 and it cannot
operate without leadership.61 As such, inaction with respect to either the budget62 or

57. But see Chafetz, supra note 15, at 2075 (differentiating between inaction which emanates from a lack of adequate public consensus and that which results from some internal
dysfunction); Teter, supra note 22, at 1441 (distinguishing between nonarbirtary and arbitrary
inaction); Tolson, supra note 23, at 2268–69 (distinguishing between permissive and excessive gridlock).
58. See Chafetz, supra note 6, at 725 (noting that appropriations laws are different from
other bills in that “their passage is necessary to the continued functioning of the entire government”); see also Neil H. Buchanan & Michael C. Dorf, How to Choose the Least
Unconstitutional Option: Lessons for the President (and Others) from the Debt Ceiling
Standoff, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1175, 1183 (2012) (arguing that congressional polarization and
inaction will lead to “budgetary gridlock forcing the president to take actions that test constitutional limits”).
59. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Transcending Formalism and Functionalism in
Separation-of-Powers Analysis: Reframing the Appointments Power After Noel Canning, 64
DUKE L.J. 1513, 1559–60 (2015) (noting that the congressional obstruction of presidential
appointments inhibits the President’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws); see
also Teter, supra note 6, at 2229 (arguing that Congress’s arbitrary inaction with respect to
presidential appointments goes against notions of constitutional fairness).
60. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
62. See Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1345–46 (1988)
(arguing that a passive approach to appropriations might be unconstitutional in some cases,
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appointments arguably abdicates Congress’s core responsibility to maintain and
preserve the government.63 In contrast, the government can continue to operate in the
absence of new legislation.64 Therefore, inaction on legislation, while it may amount
to bad policy or bad government, does not undercut the viability of the state itself.
Second, drawing the line between appropriations and appointments on one side
and legislation on the other is also supported by separation of powers concerns.
Appropriations and appointments are necessary for the President to be able to fulfill
his duties, including his obligation to “take care” the laws are faithfully executed.65
New legislation is not. Holding back on appropriations and appointments thus
crosses into matters within the domain of the executive in a way that holding back
legislation does not. To be sure, Presidents have increasingly taken on the role as
“legislator-in-chief,”66 and one can understand why a President might criticize a
Congress for blocking his legislative agenda. Yet from a separation of powers perspective, the notion that a legislature can obstruct a President’s legislative agenda is
fundamentally misplaced. Article I vests the legislative power in the Congress.67
Article II gives the President only the right to make recommendations.68
Third, separating categories of powers in which congressional inaction can be unconstitutional and those in which it cannot may also have the unexpected advantage
of curbing presidential power. As it stands now, presidents can (and do) argue that
Congress has not acted in passing needed legislation as a justification for engaging
in unilateral action.69 That, indeed, was the central argument underlying President
Obama’s “we can’t wait” strategy.70 It was also the reason offered by President
George H. W. Bush in moving forward without congressional authorization in his
initiative to fund faith-based organizations;71 and, most recently, the justification

and that “Congress has not only the power but also the duty to exercise legislative control over
federal expenditures”).
63. See David Schoenbrod, How to Salvage Article I: The Crumbling Foundation of Our
Republic, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 663, 665 (arguing that Article I intentionally assigns
Congress the power and duty to decide the most overarching policy issues).
64. In fact, as some leading constitutional theorists have argued, obstructing legislation
can at times be beneficial. See Gerhardt, supra note 42, at 2107–08 (noting that Justice Scalia
believed that gridlock was intended by the framers in order to prevent excessive legislation
and quoting Scalia as stating: “God bless gridlock.”).
65. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
66. See Schoenbrod, supra note 63, at 678 (noting that the President’s legislative power
has steadily grown, just as Congress’s legislative accountability and power has steadily
decreased).
67. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”).
68. Id. art. II, § 3 (“He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the
State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient . . . .”).
69. Lowande & Milkis, supra note 4, at 5 (noting that recent congressional gridlock has
encouraged the White House to use unilateral action “in the service of partisan objectives”).
70. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
71. Lowande & Milkis, supra note 4, at 4; Georgia A. Persons, Administrative Policy
Initiatives and the Limits of Change: Lessons from the Implementation of the Bush FaithBased and Community Initiative, 39 POL. & POL’Y 949, 950 (2011).
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set forth by President Trump for acting unilaterally in undoing portions of the
Affordable Care Act.72 Establishing that Congress is within its legitimate
prerogatives not to act on legislative matters, however, would take this rationale
for unilateral action off the President’s desk.
Fourth, breaking down the constitutionality of congressional inaction into
categories has the collateral benefit of providing a more effective incentive to
motivate Congress to break gridlock. A particularized assertion that an entity has
failed to perform a specific constitutionally required duty is a more powerful
argument than is a general condemnation that the entity has simply failed to do its
job. General criticisms sound in hyperbole. Specific critiques have bite. Further, as
business management theory instructs, setting forth specific, clearly defined goals
is a better way to both motivate actors and hold them accountable for their results
than are general directives.73
Fifth, and for largely the same reasons, to the extent that a particular battle over
the constitutionality of congressional inaction is fought politically rather than
through the courts (a matter that will be discussed subsequently), the narrow claim
that Congress has failed to perform a specific constitutional duty would have
greater resonance than would a general attack on Congress as obstructionist. To be
sure, one could argue that the battle over the nomination of Judge Merrick Garland
to the United States Supreme Court disproves this point. After all, in that instance,
the constitutional claim was made narrowly—specifically that the Congress
violated a specific and constitutionally imposed duty to give a Supreme Court
nominee a hearing.74 Perhaps. Yet, it is also true that the attack on Congress for its
inaction on Judge Garland was presented against a background of multiple attacks
on Congress for purportedly unconstitutional inaction on a wide range of matters. 75
It is therefore also possible that the power of the argument that Congress was
violating its constitutional duty by not acting was weakened by overuse.
Sixth, distinguishing between congressional inaction that threatens the government’s ability to operate and inaction that does not impair government functionality
arguably makes sense jurisprudentially. As noted above, any claim that congressional

72. Trump, supra note 10. Two days after sending this tweet, President Trump signed an
executive order ending the federal subsidy program for health insurance companies that insured low-income people and ending requirements that insurers on the health care exchange
provide certain benefits—policy changes that health experts said could unravel the Affordable
Care Act. Robert Pear, Maggie Haberman & Reed Abelson, Trump to Scrap Critical Health
Care Subsidies, Hitting Obamacare Again, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www
.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/us/politics/trump-obamacare-executive-order-health-insurance.html
[https://perma.cc/UW4M-R4XR].
73. Peter F. Drucker, Managing the Public Service Institution, PUB. INT., Fall 1973, at
43, 49.
74. David M. Herszenhorn, Merrick Garland Battle Moves to Home Front as Senate
Recesses, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/19/us/politics
/merrick-garland-supreme-court-senate-recess.html [https://perma.cc/U4GM-NL2R] (quoting
Senator Jon Tester as saying that refusing to vote on Garland’s nomination is equal to “not
following the Constitution”).
75. See Pozen, supra note 45, at 6 (citing the various obstruction-related criticisms by the
Obama administration against Senate Republicans).
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inaction is unconstitutional runs into a considerable headwind, as it is not easily supported by history, text, or structure.76 It therefore follows that claims of unconstitutionality, if they are to succeed at all, need to be both narrowly drawn and extraordinarily well justified. Setting the line based on whether congressional inaction
threatens the government’s ability to function meets these criteria.77
Finally, and undoubtedly most wistfully, instructing Congress that it has a constitutional duty to act in certain circumstances might serve to change political culture.
The position that congressional action is optional sends the message that there is no
need for members to work together because there are no common responsibilities.
The notion that Congress has a duty to act, on the other hand, tells the members that
they have common goals and common obligations. Such an understanding then could
be helpful in turning members away from the mindset of separation of parties that
currently dominates political culture78 to one in which they have greater institutional
identification.79 If so, such a change in orientation could serve to reinvigorate separation of powers.
III. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES
There are, of course, a multitude of arguments against the approach advocated in
this Essay. This Part will attempt to respond to some of the more likely challenges.
The first and primary objection has already been mentioned. It is difficult to discern
an obligation for Congress to act from the existing jurisprudence. The claim that
Congress has such a duty, therefore, would require moving the needle. I readily cede
this point, although I would suggest that drawing the line for when congressional
inaction threatens government functionality does not move the needle too far, given
the inherent constitutional mandate that elected officers have a fundamental obligation to preserve the republic.80
A second objection might be that finding Congress has a constitutional duty to act
would further weaken the Congress in its battles with the President. The power of
the purse and the power to resist presidential appointments are two of the strongest

76. See supra notes 23–44 and accompanying text.
77. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1257 (2004) (arguing that unusual or even extraconstitutional actions must be taken if the
constitutional order is in jeopardy).
78. See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2312, 2313 (2006) (discussing how Congressional members’ loyalty to their
party rather than loyalty to their branches has weakened the role of separation of powers in
checking government power). But see JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION 28–33
(2017) (arguing that separation of powers has not been weakened to the degree that Levinson
and Pildes suggest).
79. See George K. Yin, Legislative Gridlock and Nonpartisan Staff, 88 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 2287, 2303–06 (2013) (discussing nonpartisan staff on congressional committees as a
method for reducing gridlock and promoting cross-aisle cohesion).
80. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (“The Senators and Representatives . . . shall be bound
by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution . . . .”). See generally Schoenbrod, supra
note 63 (arguing that the legislators must return to the constitutionally inherent sense of responsibility that the Framers intended).
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weapons in Congress’s arsenal.81 Suggesting that there are constitutional limits on
these powers would arguably take away some of Congress’s most potent leverage in
its interbranch disputes. This objection has substantial merit as well, although only
to a point. Concluding that Congress has a duty to act in these areas does not mean
that it has to give in to the President in every instance; it only means that there are
constitutional limits on its right of inaction. Further, as noted previously, the approach suggested here would also empower Congress in the legislative arena because
it would confirm that Congress has no obligation to consider or enact legislation. As
such, it would make clear that a President does not have the right to act unilaterally
on legislative matters because of congressional inaction.82
Third, it would likely be argued that there are, and can be, no clear standards to
determine when congressional inaction runs afoul of constitutional limits.
Presumably, a congressional refusal to meet with a President to discuss a budget
might be considered improper obstruction; but would (or should) the failure to come
to agreement with the President be considered congressional obstruction if the failure
to agree is based in good faith?83 Further, if good faith is to be the standard, how is
it to be determined when Congress is acting in good faith and when it is not?
These undoubtedly are serious concerns. Nevertheless, some direction is possible.
For example, with respect to appointments, a requirement that the Senate has to give
a presidential nominee a hearing within a reasonable amount of time provides a workable standard.84 Similarly, a rule prohibiting the blocking of a nominee because of
objections to some executive branch policy having nothing to do with the prospective
nominee’s responsibilities, as occurred when Senator Jesse Helms held up a vote on
Winston Lord as ambassador to China85 or when Senator Mary Landrieu prevented
a vote on Jack Lew for OMB Director,86 is easily applied.87 Just as clear would be a
prohibition on voting against (or not voting on) a nominee, not because of any objections to that nominee, but because of an objection to the office to which that nominee has been appointed. Refusing to confirm a nominee because of opposition to the
existence of the agency rather than to the nominee himself, for example, is an action
more designed to repeal already enacted legislation than it is an action consistent
with the Senate’s obligation to appraise the merits of a nominee.88 Comparable rules

81. See Pozen, supra note 45, at 14–15 (describing Congress’s appropriations and appointment powers as being among its most formidable); see also CHAFETZ, supra note 78, at
45–151 (discussing Congress’s appropriation and appointment powers).
82. See supra notes 66–68 and accompanying text.
83. See Chafetz, supra note 6, at 772–73 (supporting the notion that one branch must be
allowed to check another in good faith, but arguing that this should be done judiciously).
84. See Teter, supra note 22, at 1482.
85. See Martin Tolchin, Helms Bars Envoy, Demanding Reagan Halt Abortion Aid, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 1, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/11/01/us/helms-bars-envoy-demanding
-reagan-halt-abortion-aid.html [https://perma.cc/HA8S-3UJ3].
86. This example is noted in Teter, supra note 22, at 1487.
87. But see CHAFETZ, supra note 78, at 134 (citing the example of blocking nominees
because of objections to some executive branch policy having nothing to do with the prospective nominee’s responsibilities, as a “capacious,” but apparently permissible, use of
Congress’s appointments powers).
88. See id. at 1449 (discussing congressional inaction on the nomination of Richard
Cordray to head the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau); see also Ylan Q. Mui, Senate
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would also make sense when dealing with appropriations issues. No votes or
nonvotes should have to be tied to the merits of the specific appropriations proposals
and not to a matter fully extraneous to the substance of the appropriations bill.89
More difficult will be determining unconstitutionality in instances in which the
basis for inaction is less straightforward. The question as to whether a particular congressional inaction is “arbitrary” versus “non-arbitrary,” in the words of Michael
Teter,90 or “excessive” versus “permissible,” as advocated by Franita Tolson,91 is not
likely to be easily determined. Congress may not take action on specific matters for
a variety of reasons, and the bases underlying congressional inaction may be hard to
uncover.92 In this respect, the approach offered here has an advantage over an acrossthe-board account of congressional inaction, in that it does not submit all congressional inaction to constitutional review. That only means, however, that the application of the test will be less frequent—not that it will be clearer.93
Fourth, the “clarity of standards” issue leads to the obvious question of enforceability. Is the question of the constitutionality of congressional inaction one that
should be resolved by the courts, or is it one in which the role of the constitutional
claim is to inform the political rhetoric that accompanies interbranch disputes?94
Ideally, I would suggest that, like many interbranch battles,95 the claim of unconstitutionality of congressional inaction is better suited to nonjudicial resolution than

Blocks Richard Cordray Confirmation to Head Consumer Watchdog Agency, WASH. POST
(Dec. 8, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/post/senate-republicansblock-cordray-as-obama-consumer-watchdog-nominee/2011/12/08/gIQA6j9BfO_blog.html
[https://perma.cc/Q2Z4-K9E9] (“Though GOP lawmakers have praised Cordray’s
qualifications for the job—he currently serves as the CFPB’s director of enforcement—they
have pledged to prevent any candidate from being confirmed unless significant structural
change are made to the bureau.”).
89. A more difficult question is presented by the vote on the debt ceiling. An argument
could be made that not raising the debt ceiling would be unconstitutional because it could
effectually force the president to take unconstitutional measures to ensure the government
continues to function properly. See Buchanan & Dorf, supra note 58, at 1188.
90. See Teter, supra note 22, at 1475 (acknowledging the difficulty of the determination).
91. Tolson, supra note 23, at 2272.
92. One issue that might commonly arise is determining who in the Congress is responsible for the inaction. See Teter, supra note 22, at 1437–38.
93. This is not to suggest, of course, that all constitutional standards must be clear. See
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (offering the test for personal jurisdiction
of whether the defendant has such minimum contacts with the forum state so that the exercise
of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice); see also
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (holding that, in order to establish standing, the plaintiff
must have suffered an injury in fact).
94. See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 12, at 1045 (arguing that the most “frequent and
important” constitutional showdowns take place outside of the courts); see also Chafetz, supra
note 6, at 769 (“In many situations, the Constitution does not dictate a stable allocation of
decisionmaking authority; rather, it fosters the ability of the branches to engage in continual
contestation for that authority.”). See generally James E. Fleming, Judicial Review Without
Judicial Supremacy: Taking the Constitution Seriously Outside the Courts, 73 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1377 (2005).
95. See Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the Struggle for
Control of Presidential Information, 90 GEO. L.J. 737, 743–44 (2002) (citing the various
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judicial enforcement. After all, asking a court to order Congress to take a specific action
because the latter is ostensibly not doing its job is a heavy lift. Perhaps, as has been
argued in the context of presidential appointments, a judicial decision could be
relatively limited in scope if the only remedy sought is an order requiring Congress to
vote on the nominee.96 However, even in this limited circumstance, I remain skeptical.
The prospect, for example, of a court entertaining an action in the nature of a mandamus
demanding that the Senate hold a confirmation vote seems an unlikely scenario.97
That said, the lack of a court remedy is equally problematic. For the constitutional
argument to have an effect in the political debate outside the courts, it must have
political resonance. 98 But it is doubtful that the claim that congressional inaction can
be unconstitutional will have such reverberation both because of its lack of historical
acceptance and because of the nature of the current political climate, which seems to
reject any norms that are not judicially imposed. A judicial ruling that congressional
inaction can be unconstitutional, in short, may be needed to change the political culture so that claims of unconstitutional congressional inaction can have traction in the
public debate.
Finally, it might be argued that the approach in this Essay does not go far enough,
and that there should be limits on congressional inaction on legislative matters as
well as on appropriations and appointments. After all, not passing critical legislation
can also be seriously damaging to the national interest. There is, of course, considerable merit to this position and, as stated previously, this Essay leaves open the question as to whether there should be constitutional scrutiny of congressional inaction
on matters affecting national security.99 For the most part, however, maintaining a
rule that congressional inaction on legislative matters should not be subject to constitutional scrutiny makes sense. As discussed previously, distinguishing Congress’s
appropriations and appointments from its legislative authority follows from separation of powers principles as well as from concerns of government functionality. More
fundamentally, however, expanding the categories of congressional powers subject
to constitutional review too broadly undercuts one of the central purposes of this
project, which is to promote a structure that serves to limit presidential power, as
well as to prompt responsive congressional behavior. Opening up the argument for
the President that the Congress may be acting unconstitutionally when it refuses to

benefits and historical precedent for nonjudicial resolution of disputes between Congress
and the President).
96. Teter, supra note 22, at 1461.
97. Of course, it once might have been assumed that maintaining a mandamus action
ordering the Secretary of State to deliver a commission to a presidential appointee would also
be an unlikely scenario. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (holding that the appointee
had a right to sue for the commission but the court in which he sued did not have proper
jurisdiction).
98. For an argument that political rhetoric influences constitutional change, see Ken I.
Kersch, The Talking Cure: How Constitutional Argument Drives Constitutional Development,
94 B.U. L. REV. 1083, 1086–87 (2014) (“Through the effective mobilization of the sovereign
people with distinctive—and often sharply antagonistic—political visions, significant constitutional change, for better or worse, is possible.”).
99. There is, of course, always the concern, however, that a President may overstate
threats of national security in order to push his agenda.
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act on his favored legislation might simply be too much of an invitation for him to
engage in unilateral action instead of proceeding through the legislative process.100
That being said, there is no doubt that this concern and the other objections to the
approach advocated in this Essay are substantial. Yet, there is also no question that
if we are to begin to overcome the problems in constitutional governance that have
been exposed by congressional obstruction, some new approach is needed.
Investigating whether there are limits on Congress’s power to do nothing by reference to specific congressional powers may offer an appropriate starting point.
CONCLUSION
In a system of checks and balances, an essential prerogative of Congress must be
its right to do nothing. Not confirming a President’s appointments, not passing his
budgets, and not enacting his proposed legislation are some of the most effective
ways that a Congress can fulfill its structural obligations and guard against executive
branch overreach. Congressional inaction, however, can also serve to improperly empower the executive, as Presidents have often used congressional inaction as a justification for exerting power unilaterally. Further, congressional inaction may be
harmful, in and of itself, as it can undercut the ability of the government to function.
In response to these concerns, this Essay suggests that congressional inaction in
the areas of presidential appointments and appropriations should be subject to constitutional scrutiny. Congressional inaction in the area of legislation, however, should
be deemed unobjectionable. Such an approach could serve to prod congressional action where it is most needed, yet also limit the ability of the President to claim he has
a right to act unilaterally on legislative matters when Congress has refused to act. As
such, it may offer a helpful starting point in addressing the dual concerns of congressional obstruction and expansive presidential power that have come to define much
of contemporary politics.

100. See generally William P. Marshall, Warning!: Self-Help and the Presidency, 124
YALE L.J.F. 95 (2014).

